NON-PER SE TREATMENT OF BUYER PRICEFIXING IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
SETTINGS
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ABSTRACT
The ability of intellectual property owners to earn monopoly
rents and the inability of horizontal competitors to price fix
legally are two propositions that are often taken as givens. This
iBrief challenges the wholesale adoption of either proposition
within the context of buyer price-fixing in intellectual property
markets. More specifically, it examines antitrust law’s role in
protecting patent holders’ rents through its condemnation of
otherwise ostensibly efficient buyer price fixing. Using basic
economic analysis, this iBrief refines the legal standards
applicable at this point of intersection between antitrust and
patent law. In particular, the author recommends the limited
abandonment of per se condemnation of buyer price-fixing
within pure intellectual property contexts. As an alternative, a
coarse screen which accounts for both price and innovation
effects is proposed. This recommendation represents one
example of how antitrust law can better account for the
complicated and imperfectly understood effects of the patent
system on social welfare.
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INTRODUCTION
The ability of intellectual property owners to earn monopoly
rents and the inability of horizontal competitors to price fix legally are
often taken as givens. This iBrief, however, challenges the wisdom of
adopting wholesale either proposition within the context of buyer pricefixing in intellectual property markets. More specifically, it examines
antitrust law’s role in protecting patent holders’ rents through the law’s
condemnation of otherwise ostensibly efficient buyer price-fixing. This
inquiry, and the resulting recommendation, entails deploying basic
economic analysis to refine the legal standards applicable at such points
of intersection between the antitrust and patent regimes despite society’s
limited understanding of the factors affecting innovation.
¶1

With regard to antitrust, this iBrief revisits the economic
assumptions underlying the per se prohibition on horizontal price-fixing
and highlights their dubious applicability within the context of pure
intellectual property. With regard to patents, this iBrief distinguishes
what a patent typically is thought to confer (the ability to pursue
monopoly rents) from what it actually confers as a legal matter
(exclusivity). Based on this analysis, this iBrief recommends the limited
abandonment of per se condemnation of buyer price-fixing within pure
intellectual property contexts. Although it does not suggest a full rule of
reason balancing test in its place, it does propose a coarse screen which
accounts for both price and innovation effects. This proposal represents
an attempt to more realistically account for the complicated effects of the
patent system on social welfare.
¶2

Part I explains the relevant law and the underlying economic
analysis behind the per se treatment of conventional buyer price fixing
conspiracies. More specifically, Part I provides a general overview of
the legal treatment of concerted action. This overview highlights the
similar treatment price-fixing receives regardless of the conspirators’
identity as buyers or sellers. The discussion also identifies the features
distinguishing conduct that is judged under the per se rule rather than the
rule of reason standard. Part I continues with a hypothetical involving a
buyer price-fixing conspiracy in which intellectual property is not
implicated. This hypothetical provides a non-intellectual property (i.e.,
tangible property) baseline for comparison with the intellectual propertybased hypothetical that is developed subsequently. The non-intellectual
property hypothetical also provides a setting in which to review the
economics of buyer price-fixing conspiracies which, in their strongest
form, effectively constitute monopsonies. The economic analysis
¶3
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generally supports the symmetric treatment of seller and buyer pricefixing in conventional non-intellectual property settings.
An intellectual property-based buyer price-fixing hypothetical is
then discussed in Part II. The main difference between tangible and
intellectual property is that the latter has a zero marginal cost of use.
This difference is critical because the underlying economic justifications
for per se condemnation of buyer price-fixing are based on economic
models that assume increasing marginal cost (i.e., a rising supply curve).
The zero marginal cost characteristic means that a buyer conspiracy
could constitute a welfare-enhancing countervailing force against seller
market power—without introducing price inefficiencies. A cost such
buyer conspiracies likely impose is reduced incentives for future
innovation. Per se treatment of intellectual property-based buyer pricefixing then reflects—whether consciously or not—a determination that
the boycott’s harmful influence on reducing future innovation outweighs
the benefit associated with lowering current price. Subsequent parts of
this iBrief reject this assumption.
¶4

Part III then introduces the perennial and difficult problem of
weighing current benefits against uncertain future harms which, within
the intellectual property context, would become central if such boycotts
received rule of reason treatment. Part IV proposes a partial solution that
entails a coarse screen, which accounts for price efficiencies and
innovation harms while avoiding outright weighing. The course screen
avoids such weighing by focusing upon the existence or nonexistence of
these efficiencies rather than their relative magnitudes. Finally, Part IV
concludes by considering two implicit noneconomic assumptions that
might erroneously be viewed as supporting the status quo per se
treatment of the conduct at issue. One such assumption is that price
efficiencies from joint action are not worthy of consideration. The
second assumption is that protecting the exclusivity conferred by the
patent system should dominate competition concerns. Addressing these
assumptions is critical because adherence to them, whether wittingly or
unwittingly, dissuades inquiries such the one undertaken here.
¶5

I. BUYER PRICE-FIXING CONSPIRACIES
WITHOUT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Part I presents the basic law and economics of buyer price-fixing
conspiracies that do not involve intellectual property. As a basis for that
discussion, Section A provides a brief overview regarding price-fixing
with a particular focus upon the comparison of buyer and seller
treatment. Section B then introduces a simple hypothetical involving
buyer price-fixing characterized by the general type of buyer conspiracy
with which the law has traditionally dealt—non-intellectual property—
¶6
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and provides a clear baseline against which subsequent fact patterns
involving intellectual property can be compared. Several features of this
hypothetical warrant particular attention including the description of the
market pre- and post-conspiracy and the conspiracy’s likely treatment
under the law. Section C then explores the welfare implications of buyer
price-fixing when viewed through an economic lens. This economic
welfare analysis occurs primarily through a discussion of the most
extreme form of buying power—monopsony.
The analysis provides
some support for the symmetric treatment of buyer and seller price-fixing
involving tangible goods.

A. Legal Treatment of Concerted Action
The antitrust implications of collusion among buyers of
intellectual property are best understood within the broader context of
concerted action by buyers and by sellers. This section provides a general
foundation upon which subsequent parts of this iBrief elaborate. What is
important, for instant purposes, is identifying the key features which
distinguish those concerted actions that receive per se, rather than rule of
reason, treatment. The distinction between these two legal standards is
critical because it essentially dictates the role of market power and
efficiency defenses in the antitrust analysis. Under a per se standard, the
conduct itself is illegal, whereas under a rule of reason standard, the
plaintiff must prove a competitive harm.
¶7

Horizontal price fixing conspiracies2 fall within the broader
category of concerted refusals to deal. Depending on the context,
concerted refusals to deal are analyzed under a per se or a rule of reason
standard. The primary determinants of the applicable legal standard are
(1) the nature of the refusal to deal (e.g., price-fixing versus eliminating
particular business practices, horizontal versus vertical agreement), (2)
the goal of the refusal to deal (e.g., disadvantage a competitor), (3) the
presence or absence of a legally cognizable justification for the action
(e.g., increased efficiency), and (4) the nature of the entity or parties
conducting the refusal (e.g., individual private parties or professional
associations).3 Two important factors, which this iBrief argues receive
inadequate recognition, are the identity of the conspirators as either
buyers or sellers; and the nature of the boycotted goods as either tangible
or intangible property.
¶8

Although the exact contours of what constitutes price-fixing are
not always clear, it has been found when actions manipulate the pricing
¶9

2

A horizontal price-fixing conspiracy among buyers is an agreement among
competing purchasers to buy from one or more sellers at an agreed-upon price.
3
See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW
OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §§ 5.4a1-a2 (3d ed. 2005).
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mechanism in the economy and do not seem to further another legitimate
objective. Horizontal price-fixing by sellers has long been treated as per
se unlawful.4 This prohibition has been extended to a wide range of
pricing conspiracies5 including bid rigging and bid allocation,6 agreement
on credit terms,7 agreement to use previously announced prices that were
set independently8 and agreements on maximum prices.9

B. Tangible Property Hypothetical
But what about price-fixing among buyers?
following hypothetical:
¶10

Consider the

A large number of sellers with no proprietary intellectual property
offer identical inputs to many identical buyers who compete against
each other in the sale of a product that uses the input. The buyers
allegedly conspire to refuse to purchase the inputs unless the price is
reduced significantly beneath the level that otherwise would have
been obtained in the market.

This hypothetical involving tangible property describes a
situation in which buyers in an otherwise competitive market combine to
influence prices. In an antitrust lawsuit, the plaintiffs would need to
prove the existence of a conspiracy.10 Assuming arguendo the existence
of a conspiracy, the legal focus becomes assessing the characteristics of
the restraint Section A delineated.
¶11

In this tangible property hypothetical, the buyers seek a price
lower than what the market would likely yield. In essence, this
conspiracy, assuming buyer market power, could distort an otherwise
competitive outcome. The hypothetical conspiracy not only is clearly
designed to fix prices, and as such is inherently suspect, but it also enjoys
no procompetitive justification.
¶12

4

See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 81–
90 (6th ed. 2007) (discussing these and other direct price-fixing arrangements).
6
See United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1083 (1981).
7
See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
8
See Sugar Inst. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
9
See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
10
When the plaintiff is a private party, the plaintiff must also demonstrate a
cognizable antitrust injury to have standing. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW, supra note 5, at 817–23. At least one court has “assum[ed] without
deciding that a lack of future innovation is a cognizable antitrust injury.” Glen
Holly Entm’t, Inc. v. Tektronix, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1079 (C.D. Cal.
1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 352 F.3d 367, 374 (9th Cir. 2003)
(characterizing the district court’s “understanding of antitrust injury [as] too
restrictive”).
5
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On rare occasion, a court has distinguished between buyer and
seller price-fixing conspiracies and treated the former more leniently
because they are considered less inimical to efficiency, in part because
the goal of such actions is normally a lower price, which may improve
consumer welfare.11 Most often, however, courts do not distinguish
between seller and buyer price-fixing conspiracies, subjecting both to per
se analysis. Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co. is
the seminal Supreme Court case establishing the contours of antitrust
treatment of buyer-side boycotts.12 Mandeville Island involved a
conspiracy of three sugar refiners to fix the price they paid for sugar
beets.13 The Court held, “[i]t is clear that the agreement is the sort of
combination condemned by the [Sherman] Act, even though the price
fixing was by purchasers, and the persons specially injured under the
treble damage claim are sellers, not customers or consumers.”14 The
Court explained:
¶13

The [Sherman Act] does not confine its protection to consumers, or
to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it immunize
the outlawed acts because they are done by any of these. The Act is
comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are
made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be
perpetrated.15

Based on Mandeville Island, a court analyzing the tangible
property hypothetical would condemn it as per se illegal.16 This iBrief
argues below that such per se treatment, while appropriate for most
settings, is not appropriate for settings involving intellectual property,
which typically present price efficiencies. In particular, this iBrief
argues that antitrust law should recognize these efficiencies, and
proposes a legal framework for doing so.
¶14

C. Economics of Buyer Price-Fixing Involving Tangible Property
The legal treatment concerted action receives relates to its
anticompetitive effect (whether actual or presumed), which in turn
reflects an economic assessment. That assessment entails comparing the
¶15

11

See Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313,
316–17 (6th Cir. 1989). For a discussion of Balmoral, see infra ¶¶ 28–29.
12
See 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
13
Id. at 223.
14
Id. at 235.
15
Id. at 236.
16
Mandeville Island differs from the tangible property hypothetical in that,
unlike the hypothetical defendants, the defendants in Mandeville Island (three
sugar refiners) may have enjoyed some market power apart from their
conspiratorial conduct.
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economic efficiency of the pre-conspiracy market with that of the postconspiracy market. To illustrate the basic economics, this section
compares a perfectly competitive pre-conspiracy market (competitive for
both buyers and sellers) with a post-conspiracy market in which the
buyer side of the market is entirely cartelized (i.e., the buyers act as if
they were a single buyer—a monopsonist) and the seller side is
competitive.17
Perfectly Competitive Pre-Conspiracy Market. A given market
typically consists of a number of buyers with different valuations for the
product being sold and a number of sellers with different costs for
producing various amounts of the product. For each possible price there
is an aggregate number of units that buyers are willing to purchase and
an aggregate number of units that sellers are willing to supply.
Economists represent the aggregate willingness to purchase and the
aggregate willingness to supply on a two-dimensional graph in which
price and quantity are represented on the y and x-axes respectively. The
aggregate willingness to purchase as a function of price, represented as a
demand curve, is typically downward sloping because as price falls, the
number of units that buyers are willing to purchase increases. Similarly,
the aggregate willingness to supply as a function of price, represented as
the supply curve, is typically upward sloping. If there is heterogeneity in
production costs, the more efficient suppliers generate the lower part of
the supply curve because they are willing to produce units at lower
prices. Presumably, capacity constraints prevent even the most efficient
suppliers from supplying the entire market.
¶16

In a competitive market, the market price is the price at which
the total amount the buyers demand equals the total amount the sellers
supply at that price and is represented graphically by the point at which
the demand and supply curves intersect. A competitive market has the
valuable feature of allocative efficiency18 because all buyers willing to
purchase at an amount greater than or equal to the suppliers’ marginal
cost can do so, and no buyer is supplied whose willingness to purchase is
less than the cost to supply that buyer.
Assuming that price
discrimination19 is impossible, all buyers pay the same price. As noted,
the pre-conspiracy hypothetical assumes a perfectly competitive market.
¶17

17

The analysis in ¶¶ 16–18 parallels ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON,
MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 36–42 (1993).
18
“Allocation of goods in which no one can be made better off unless someone
is made worse off.” ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD,
MICROECONOMICS 666 (5th ed. 2001).
19
“Practice of charging different prices to different consumers for similar
goods.” Id. at 670.
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Post-Conspiracy Market. Now consider the effect if all buyers in
the hypothetical participate in a buyer price-fixing conspiracy and act as
a single monopsonist. This extreme case of a complete buyer conspiracy
simplifies the economic analysis; however, even with less extensive
conspiracies, the same basic outcome will result. The buyer conspiracy
alters the price dynamics of the market in several ways. Assume, for
example, that the buyers refuse to purchase unless the price is five
percent lower than the competitive price. If the sellers acquiesce to this
demand, the buyers would then receive every unit supplied at this
discounted price; however, some marginal sellers with costs above this
lower price (and below the previous competitive price) will now refuse
to supply. The effect of this particular conspiracy, therefore, would be to
lower both the price and the overall quantity purchased relative to the
fully competitive outcome. Given an upward sloping supply curve,
monopsony leads to misallocated resources and reduced social welfare.20
Misallocation necessarily occurs because additional units can be
produced at a cost that is lower than the value of those additional units to
some unsatiated buyers in the market. Assuming an efficiency-based
standard, this necessarily inefficient outcome warrants per se
condemnation.21 The question then becomes, under what circumstances,
if any, will buyer price fixing not necessarily yield an inefficient
outcome? The answer, explored subsequently, includes when the supply
curve is flat.
¶18

Seller Market Power. One might initially assume a lack of
symmetry exists between buyer and seller price-fixing. After all, sellers
fix prices above the competitive price whereas buyers fix prices below
the competitive price and lower prices would seem to have the potential
of improving social welfare. The key economic question, though, is can
buyer price-fixing result in more efficient resource allocation?
¶19

As constructed, the hypothetical is restricted to settings with
many sellers and, therefore, no seller market power. If market power
existed on the seller side, the impact of a buyer conspiracy would be
affected. A divergence from perfect competition resulting from seller
market power would result in higher prices and lower quantity supplied
¶20

20

This iBrief primarily addresses the sale of intermediate goods for which the
buyers and sellers are firms. Without further assumptions regarding
downstream market structure, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions
regarding consumer welfare.
21
The role of non-efficiency based rationales is beyond the scope of this iBrief.
For a discussion of those rationales, see Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as
the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 899 (1999) (arguing that the Sherman Act’s
primary goal was “protecting consumers from unfair transfers of wealth”).
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than would have been obtained in a competitive market. In such an
imperfect market, if the buyers (who individually lack market power) did
not form a conspiracy, then the market price would exceed the
competitive price. Consequently, a buyer conspiracy that forced price
lower might have some positive welfare effects. The welfare effect of
this form of “countervailing power” depends on many economic
variables and can be either positive or negative.22
The analysis of buyer price-fixing is further complicated in
settings where the conspirators are not the ultimate end users but are
intermediate good users who purchase inputs to make a product then sold
to end consumers. Given an intermediate purchaser, the welfare effect of
the various conspiracy scenarios depends upon the nature of the
downstream final good market, the upstream intermediate good market,
as well as the conduct of the market participants.23 Though the role of
countervailing power is discussed in greater detail subsequently, it is
clear that an ambiguous effect on efficiency undermines the case for per
se condemnation.
¶21

The economic analysis above provides a limited justification for
the symmetric treatment (i.e., per se condemnation) that has developed in
the law for both buyer and seller price-fixing. Part II explores the
limitations of that symmetric per se condemnation through an economic
analysis of buyer price-fixing conspiracies specifically involving
intellectual property and a critical assessment of the primary legal
precedents.
¶22

II. BUYER PRICE-FIXING CONSPIRACIES
INVOLVING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A critical feature of the tangible property hypothetical in Part I is
the presence of an upward sloping supply curve. Revisiting that
¶23

22

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF
COUNTERVAILING POWER 111 (Sentry ed. 1956). Galbraith identifies
“countervailing power” as the “counterpart to competition.” Id. “In the
competitive model – the economy of many sellers each with a small share of the
total market – the restraint on the private exercise of economic power was
provided by other firms on the same side of the market.” Id. at 110. When the
“restraint on private power” emanates from customers or suppliers rather than
competitors vis-à-vis the power, it is “countervailing power.” Id. at 111. “The
first [private power] begets the second [countervailing power].” Id. For further
discussion, see discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
23
See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 17, at 121–25 (discussing the ambiguous
effects of monopsony as countervailing power and the risk buyer collusion may
pose for downstream markets); see also infra note 106 (discussing the possible
interplay of upstream buyer collusion and downstream seller collusion).
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assumption, and instead incorporating a flat supply curve, is the focus of
Part II. If a patent confers a unique advantage, then it is possible that
both market power and a flat supply curve may be present. The following
hypothetical facilitates exploration of the law and economics of such a
scenario.

A. Intellectual Property Hypothetical
A single seller offers to multiple buyers a license which allows them
to produce products that would incorporate the seller’s patented
technology. No substitutes for the seller’s patented technology exist
and the seller is charging a per use price (royalty). The buyers
allegedly conspire to purchase a license for the patented technology
only for prices at an agreed upon level. This conspiratorial price is
less than the monopoly price that would have prevailed without the
conspiracy.

Though the intellectual property hypothetical (“IP hypothetical”)
generally parallels the tangible property hypothetical, it differs in three
ways. First, a single seller exists with an effective monopoly over a
required input. Second, the seller’s input is intellectual property instead
of tangible property. Finally, the seller is licensing its product (the
intellectual property) rather than selling a physical input. This
hypothetical focuses on patent licensing, which is a commonly
encountered practice that also provides a useful starting point for
understanding buyer price-fixing involving other types of intellectual
property transactions.
¶24

The assumption of a monopoly seller implies that the selling
price is likely to exceed the competitive price, perhaps by a significant
margin. A variant of the IP hypothetical, more aligned with the tangible
property hypothetical, would assume that multiple sellers of patented
technologies exist that are perfect substitutes for each other. In such a
scenario, the pre-conspiracy market outcome would be competitive. This
variant underscores the idea that a patent, while offering exclusivity,
does not guarantee the patent-holder market power. The analysis of this
variant would be similar to the analysis presented below except no
countervailing power would be implicated.
¶25

Under existing law, the critical similarity between the IP and
tangible property hypotheticals is the presence of a buyer price-fixing
conspiracy. Therefore, the conspiracy in the IP hypothetical, just as the
conspiracy in the tangible property hypothetical, is per se illegal, or at
least it is under conventional interpretations of Mandeville Island.
Closer inspection of the facts of the Mandeville Island line of cases,
however, reveals an underappreciated dimension of analysis. Despite its
broad pronouncements regarding buyer price-fixing, Mandeville Island
¶26
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involved a specific fact pattern wherein the buyers enjoyed market power
that the sellers lacked.24 The relative market power of buyers and sellers
can have profound consequences for a conspiracy’s economic impact and
welfare implications. This point will be expanded upon subsequently,
but what is most important for instant purposes is that a strong basis
exists for arguing that Mandeville Island ought not receive a broad
construction.
Perhaps the most nuanced treatment of Mandeville Island is
Judge Posner’s ruling in Vogel v. American Society of Appraisers.25
Posner held that
¶27

buyer cartels, the object of which is to force the prices that suppliers
charge the members of the cartel below the competitive level, are
illegal per se . . . . Just as a sellers’ cartel enables the charging of
monopoly prices, a buyers’ cartel enables the charging of
monopsony prices; and monopoly and monopsony are symmetrical
distortions of competition from an economic standpoint.26

Unfortunately, Posner’s analysis begs the question concerning what
treatment is warranted when supplier market power exists and, therefore,
it is possible that buyers engaging in price-fixing activities are not
lowering price beneath a “competitive level.”
Albeit in dicta, the most prominent judicial ruling advocating
treatment of a buyer conspiracy under the rule of reason standard is
Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp.27 In Balmoral the
Sixth Circuit refused to condemn a group boycott affecting price as per
se illegal. The court noted that the boycott at issue “may simply lower
prices” the boycotters pay to the upstream suppliers.28 These are
suppliers who, the court further observed, “have historically wielded
great market power . . . at the expense of [the boycotters].”29 The court
then concluded that the boycotters “may be justified in combating the
market power of [the suppliers] by group action. Such action may lower
prices to [ultimate consumers] at the box office and may serve rather
than undermine consumer welfare.”30 In so doing, Balmoral recognized
¶28

24

Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 222–
24 (1948).
25
744 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984).
26
Id. at 601. This harsh antitrust treatment of buyer price fixing is supported by
the foregoing economic arguments in the presence of a normal supply curve. See
discussion supra ¶ 18.
27
885 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989).
28
Id. at 316.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 316–17.
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in dicta the possibility that buyer price-fixing can legally function as a
countervailing force against seller market power.
The Balmoral ruling is somewhat confused and has been broadly
denounced, though it is doubtful whether the latter reflects the former.
Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, representative of most
commentators, are extremely critical of Balmoral. They write with a
citation to Mandeville Island, “most courts understand a buying cartel’s
low buying prices are illegal and bring antitrust injury and standing to the
victimized suppliers.”31 Specifically identifying Balmoral, Areeda and
Hovenkamp continue, “[c]learly mistaken is the occasional court that
considers low buying prices pro-competitive or that thinks sellers
receiving illegally low prices do not suffer antitrust injury.”32 But,
crediting the facts posited by the Sixth Circuit, particularly regarding
seller market power, Balmoral is factually distinguishable from
Mandeville Island and its dicta regarding countervailing power has
economic merit. Furthermore, even without seller market power,
circumstances exist wherein buyer price-fixing does not create market
inefficiency; one such circumstance involves intellectual property
settings. Section B analyzes the effects of buyer price-fixing and finds
that the characteristics typifying intellectual property undermine the price
inefficiency justification for per se treatment.
¶29

B. The Economics of Buyer Price Fixing Involving Intellectual
Property
This section analyzes the economics of buyer price-fixing
involving intellectual property. As in Section A, this section assumes
that the buyer conspiracy includes all buyers in the market and that they
act jointly as a monopsonist. It first addresses the potential for buyer
price-fixing regarding intellectual property, with its constant marginal
cost of zero, to increase static efficiency. To understand overall
competitive impact, however, such price efficiency gains must be offset
against any innovation losses. Therefore, this section then considers the
impact of such conduct on innovation incentives and, ultimately,
innovation. The difficulty of balancing price and innovation effects is
addressed in Part III.
¶30

1. Constant Marginal Costs and a Monopolist Seller
¶31
Unlike labor or tangible inputs to production, pure intellectual
property (an information good such as the underlying knowledge in a
patent) does not involve a cost in use. Stated alternatively, the cost of
31

PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 2 ANTITRUST LAW, § 375b at
297 (rev. ed. 1995).
32
Id.

2011

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 004

using an additional unit of information is zero; intellectual property
exhibits a flat zero marginal cost. Consequently, if the monopsonist is
able to lower the per unit price for the intellectual property, no reduction
in supply of the input should occur (assuming the price remains above
zero). Without this reduction in supply, there will be no static resource
allocation issue or short-run inefficiency, only a redistribution of surplus
from the sellers to the buyers.33 This intellectual property setting
contrasts with the tangible property hypothetical that involves a rising
industry supply curve. In the tangible property hypothetical, a reduction
in price below the competitive level results in a reduction from the
efficient output level.
Intellectual property is not unique among different forms of
property in exhibiting a flat supply curve;34 it is, however, an easily
identifiable class of property with this characteristic, and it has a zero
marginal cost. In non-intellectual property settings, the flatness of the
supply curve and the actual cost will frequently present contentious
factual issues. Moreover, intellectual property, e.g., legal grants of
exclusivity in patents, may involve settings where the intellectual
property-holder (the seller) has market power. Exclusivity given as the
result of a patent, of course, does not imply market power, but all other
things held equal, exclusivity increases the likelihood of market power.
Additionally, profitable buyer conspiracies are mounted against suppliers
whose products are supplied competitively.35 Thus, an intent to counter
supplier market power is not a necessary condition for a buyer
conspiracy.
¶32

Consider, for example, a pure intellectual property scenario in
which the relevant intellectual property is a strong patent. Patent
strength, for instant purposes, varies inversely with both the likelihood it
would be overturned as improvidently granted and the ease with which it
¶33

33

See generally Jonathan M. Jacobson & Gary J. Dorman, Monopsony
Revisited: A Comment on Blair & Harrison, 1992 ANTITRUST BULL. 151 (1992)
(observing that a flat supply curve will not result in a short-run inefficiency).
They advocate an asymmetrical treatment of monopoly and monopsony (with
the latter receiving more lenient treatment than the former) because “in an
industry with a flat supply curve, variations in the quantity purchased will have
no effect on price at all.” Id. at 154–55. No mention is made of intellectual
property or information goods.
34
Jacobson and Dorman argue that “strong evidence [exists] that, at prevailing
levels of production, industrial market supply curves are typically flat.” Id. at
156. Though, firms in industries with cyclical demand will frequently operate in
the upward sloping portion of their short-run supply curves.
35
See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219 (1948).
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could be circumvented with alternative technology.36 The holder of a
strong patent has market power, which allows the holder to obtain a
supracompetitive price for licenses to use the patent. In such
circumstances, it is common for the license to involve a per unit (per use)
royalty, especially when the buyers and sellers disagree about the value
of the intellectual property (e.g., the scope or demand for the intellectual
property’s use). Such a royalty reduces the quantity of use of the
intellectual property, and because the marginal cost for use of the patent
by these buyers is zero, a resource misallocation results. Reduction of
the price charged to the buyers will lead to a short-run improvement in
resource allocation. Stated alternatively, a conspiracy to reduce the price
of the patent license (assuming per unit pricing) will increase price
efficiency.
Licenses may involve a per unit fee, a fixed fee, or some
combination thereof. Assuming a per unit fee, the price reduction which
results from the buyer conspiracy carries with it the possibility of price
efficiencies which could offset possible innovation harm. When a fixed
fee is involved, the possibility of static efficiency gains is present, though
in the form of a greater number of firms that could license the lowerpriced intellectual property. Under such circumstances, the consumer
benefit is somewhat more indirect because it depends on whether those
additional buyers (who purchase as a result of the lower-priced
intellectual property) sell to customers who otherwise would not have
been supplied by the pre-existing buyers.37
¶34

Importantly, it does not follow as a natural extension of this
analysis that sellers without market power should be permitted to
conspire against buyers with market power. The creation of a monopoly
to counteract a monopsony should not be countenanced. The virtue of a
flat supply curve is that regardless of the degree of buyer market power,
the buyers can never drive price beneath an efficient level (marginal
cost). In contrast, a supplier cartel will not be limited to prices at or
below the efficient level unless the demand curve is flat (perfectly
elastic), which is extremely unlikely.38
¶35

36

James J. Anton, Hillary Greene & Dennis A. Yao, Policy Implications of
Weak Patent Rights, in 6 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1, 1 (Adam
Jaffe et al. eds., 2006) (distinguishing weak versus strong patents). Though this
iBrief focuses on patents, the analysis is applicable to intellectual property more
generally.
37
If the buyer conspiracy forced the seller to accept an “equivalent” fixed fee in
lieu of per unit royalties, then social welfare would unambiguously improve.
Proving that the fixed fee has not been forced downward, however, would be
difficult.
38
See generally Jacobson & Dorman, supra note 33, at 155.
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2. Innovation Incentives and the Harm to Innovation
¶36
A per unit license fee of zero is price efficient for pure
intellectual property goods. Such a license fee would not, by itself, allow
the innovator to earn profits; therefore, it would likely reduce the
incentives for future innovation. Harm to innovation in this setting refers
to the reduction in future innovation that results from buyer conspiracies
reducing the rewards innovators can expect in the future. The notion that
harm to social welfare will ensue from harm to innovation reflects the
general belief that markets typically generate innovation levels below, or
at best equal to, optimal levels. In economic terms, this harm to
innovation is referred to as dynamic or innovation inefficiency.
A buyer conspiracy directly reduces the profits from innovation
and intellectual property that has already been created. Therefore, to
understand the dynamic effects of the conspiracy, one must examine the
connection between those current effects and the incentive to invest in
future innovation. The strength of this link depends on several
considerations. First, how many potential innovators (sellers) are likely
to be affected and how important are they? Second, how aggressively
will buyers attempt to expropriate innovators’ rents through a
conspiracy? As a related matter, will buyers’ self-interest in on-going
innovation serve as a check on their collective activity? Third, is the
conspiracy likely to persist or another be created in response to a future
innovation given the state of the law and the existence of a relevant
conspiracy today? Although definitive answers to these questions are
not available, the following observations provide the context for this
iBrief’s antitrust analysis and proposed recommendation.
¶37

The impact of an effective buyer conspiracy on innovators is
difficult to estimate.39 An effective conspiracy operating in a market
today would seem most likely to affect innovation in that given market
and in proximate markets with similar structural characteristics involving
many of the same buyers. For example, the existence of a manufacturer
buyer conspiracy within a given industry more greatly threatens future
innovation profits of the sellers if seller-innovators anticipate that their
inventions will be sold in significant part to the manufacturers in that
conspiracy-laden industry. On the other hand, if most inventions
purchased by the manufacturers in the given industry come from a wide
range of innovators, few of which anticipate those manufacturers as their
¶38

39

The debate regarding the use of innovation markets underscores how hard it is
to predict effects of current choices (e.g., a merger) on future innovation
outcomes. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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primary buyers, it seems less likely that such a manufacturer conspiracy
will significantly affect innovation incentives.40
The aggressiveness of a buyer conspiracy also would affect the
harm to innovation. Buyer conspirators would likely argue that it was
contrary to their own interests to influence price to such an extent so as
to reduce the number of suppliers in the market or to reduce future
innovation.41 Such self-limiting arguments are superficially appealing;
however, many reasons exist why such arguments warrant some
skepticism. The buyers may not adequately weigh the effects of their
action on future innovation by sellers because the buyers substantially
discount the future or do not envision the sellers as likely sources of
innovation that will individually advantage the buyers. Additionally,
new innovations may have systemic effects on how a firm manufactures
and markets its products to its buyers. Some innovations may undermine
market structure by lowering economies of scale or may diminish the
value of a firm’s particular competences (e.g., the value of being able to
provide outstanding post-sale service might be reduced by innovations
that increase product reliability).42 In such cases, incumbent buyers may
value innovation to a lesser extent than society. Finally, some general
skepticism about the complete foresight and rationality of the buyers
seems warranted.43
¶39

In addition to the aggressiveness of the buyer conspiracy, its
durability is also critical. Will a buyer conspiracy that was formed to
extract a lower price today persist, or be easy to reconstitute, in the
future? Ample recognition exists that a history of successful collusion
increases the probability of future successful collusion.44 On the other
¶40

40

One could argue more generally that any lenience towards buyer conspiracies
reduces overall innovation incentives, but this effect is likely to be of much less
significance than the direct industry effect discussed here.
41
See, e.g., Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Soundview Techs., Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 180,
185 (D. Conn. 2001) (argument made by defendants). In Soundview, for
example, if the television manufacturers’ future profits depended on a stream of
innovation that came, in part, from suppliers such as Soundview, then the
manufacturers should consider the effects of their conspiracy on suppliers’
innovation incentives.
42
See, e.g., Michael L. Tushman & Philip Anderson, Technological
Discontinuities and Organizational Environments, 31 ADM. SCI. Q. 439 (1986)
(innovations can reduce an incumbent’s competitive advantage by undermining
the significance of its existing competences).
43
Soundview, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 186 (“[B]usiness conduct is not always
rational, and economic actors do not always have access to perfect information,
the utopian ideal of economics.”).
44
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.1 (1997) [hereinafter U.S. HORIZONTAL MERGER
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hand, a history of competition involving exclusive access to cutting-edge
technologies would also suggest that a future conspiracy would be
unlikely because important innovations are frequently best exploited
through exclusive or near-exclusive supply relationships.45 Finally,
conspiratorial relationships that normally would be extremely unlikely
might, nonetheless, arise in response to an unusual circumstance such as
the innovation in question being mandated as part of a government
regulation or as part of an industry standard. Without another catalyst
for concerted action, renewed conspiratorial conduct would be unlikely.
These brief observations suggest that establishing a link between
a conspiracy today and a reduction in incentives to invest tomorrow is
both fact-intensive and a notoriously uncertain undertaking. Moreover,
establishing harm to innovation based on reduced innovation incentives
is even more uncertain. First, it is not always true that reducing
incentives to innovate in one market will reduce overall innovation.
Second, although the directional effect of the conspiracy in reducing
direct innovation incentives is usually clear, with possible exceptions
including when the intellectual property is an input to further innovation,
it does not necessarily follow that welfare will be reduced. Reducing
innovation incentives in this specific manner would reduce welfare if the
current incentives to innovate were either optimal or too low. If direct
innovation incentives are already excessive, then reducing those
incentives would improve innovative efficiency.
Arguments abound
concerning poorly directed innovative efforts or efforts channeled to
circumvent existing patents rather than to generate truly new
knowledge.46 Moreover, even if the overall innovation incentives were
correctly calibrated, the incentives as applied in any individual marketinnovation setting may still be misaligned. Third, when the intellectual
property at issue is an input for further innovation (e.g., a research tool),
it is plausible that increased access to the input (owing to a lower price)
will sometimes lead to an increase in downstream innovation sufficient
to offset the effects of the reduced incentives for upstream innovation.
¶41

In sum, buyer price-fixing of intellectual property can have both
price and innovation effects that may be difficult to discern and
potentially contradictory.
The question becomes whether rigid
¶42

GUIDELINES] (recognizing the relationship between historic and future
collusion), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm.
45
With limited substitutes for the technology, exclusivity allows the licensee to
extract monopoly-like profits that are typically greater than the sum of the
profits of the sellers who compete with each other.
46
FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 2, at 18–25 (2003), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
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adherence to Mandeville Island will undermine the courts’ ability to
adequately address that complex reality. Part III specifically explores the
circumstances requiring a balancing of price benefits and innovation
harms.

III. THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF BALANCING INNOVATION HARM
VERSUS PRICE EFFICIENCY BENEFITS
The indeterminacy associated with intellectual property-based
rents and innovation is particularly challenging for policy makers and
courts that seek to assess the extent of innovation harm caused by a
buyer conspiracy and weigh it against other benefits or costs. There are
various ways to proceed given the oftentimes unquantifiable and
arguably incommensurate welfare effects at issue. One could favor
approaches that minimize the need for weighing, such as allowing
current “more certain” effects to dominate future “speculative” benefits
and harms or permitting any innovation effect to trump a price effect.
Such bright-line, albeit one-sided, rules have some appeal given society’s
inability to meaningfully compare current price effects and future
innovation effects. But, such simple rules may also become attractive
nuisances that weaken attempts to make progress on the critical
underlying issues.
¶43

Although the challenge of balancing innovation harms and price
efficiency benefits is large, it is not entirely novel. Courts are often
plagued by the need to balance the benefits and harms associated with
more concrete current effects against uncertain future effects (e.g.,
deterrence).47 This weighing is comparatively easy when the antitrust
¶44

47

The challenge attendant to assessing the future effects of buyer conspiracies is
not unique to innovation-related matters, though the presence of an innovation
component may influence the assessment. Consider, for example, the
implications of a buyer price-fixing conspiracy upon (1) the incentive of nonintellectual property sellers’ investment in plants or other tangible property that
are anticipated to provide an increased stream of future profits and (2) the
incentive of intellectual property sellers to invest in research and development.
With regard to the tangible property investment, assume a seller is considering
undertaking a substantial fixed cost to upgrade its plant equipment so that the
variable cost of production is reduced. The prospect of a successful buyer
conspiracy to push the sale price close to marginal cost would reduce the
incentive of the sellers to invest in this plant upgrade. Determining whether this
“harm to future investment” would be harmful in a welfare sense would, for
example, entail an assessment of whether the pre-existing investment level was
efficient or inefficiently high. Engaging in an analogous assessment of future
research and development investment, anticipation of a buyer conspiracy would
reduce the incentive of the intellectual property sellers to invest in research and
development with decreased innovation as a likely consequence. Decreased
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conduct at issue has uniformly negative effects on price efficiency and
(supposedly) innovative efficiency. But the prior analysis makes clear
that with intellectual property, buyer price-fixing does not have such
characteristics, because the nature of intellectual property makes it very
likely that buyer price-fixing will yield positive benefits regarding price
efficiency. The question becomes, should antitrust law embrace a
substantially imperfect but easy to implement rule or a theoretically more
precise but difficult to implement rule?
In Part II, this iBrief argued that buyer price-fixing conspiracies
involving pure intellectual property do not have the same negative
welfare characteristics as seller price-fixing conspiracies. If colorable
claims of both price-based efficiencies and innovation harm exist and are
considered, the court’s task in weighing these effects becomes extremely
complex. The benefit derived from promoting innovation does not relate
to the particular patent in question since that invention already exists.
Rather, the harm at issue concerns incentives for future innovation.
Thus, compared to the immediate and relatively quantifiable effects of a
decreased price on welfare, harm to innovation is hard to quantify, but
could potentially be of greater significance than the price effects. Part III
explores efforts to engage in such a weighing in price-fixing (Section A)
and non-price-fixing (Section B) settings.
¶45

A. Balancing in Price-Fixing Settings
The core of the per se standard (here, per se condemnation) is
the absence of balancing. Not surprisingly, balancing static and dynamic
effects in price-fixing settings is an extremely infrequent occurrence,
although more informal weighing may occur. Section A discusses two
cases that are notable for their apparent openness to engage in the
weighing of static and dynamic effects, though neither court ultimately
engaged in such weighing. The third case is noteworthy for the court’s
unwillingness to consider possible, perhaps even likely, future effects
and, thereby, avoids weighing altogether.
¶46

In Shapiro v. General Motors Corp., a holder of patents
pertaining to automobile seat belt retractors argued that the major
¶47

innovation, like decreased investment in tangible property (e.g., physical plant),
need not always result in decreased social welfare. Such a conspiracy-induced
decrease in innovation translates into a decrease in welfare if the pre-conspiracy
level of innovation was not excessive; while such a condition is usually assumed
to be met, it is not always met. Owing to the pervasiveness of this assumption,
however, decreased innovation is largely equated with a “harm to innovation.”
See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 46, ch. 1, at 4 (citations omitted) (“It
is unlikely that there is too much innovation from the viewpoint of economic
welfare.”).
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automakers’ royalty-free second sourcing policies toward supplier
technologies were anticompetitive because the policies harmed
innovation.48
In granting summary judgment for the defendant
automakers, the court found “no colorable showing of a conspiracy” and,
absent a conspiracy, ruled that the plaintiff lacked standing.49
Nonetheless, the court’s dicta provides interesting insight into the uneasy
relationship between static and dynamic efficiency.
The court
acknowledged the possibility that, given sufficient pass-through,
consumers could benefit from lower prices for access to the patents and
that this possible gain would have to be balanced against any harm to
innovation.50
Although the court did not have to determine the extent of the
innovation harm due to the alleged expropriation of patent rents because
it found no conspiracy, the court expressed skepticism regarding the size
of the expropriation itself.51 Had a conspiracy been found, the court
suggested that it would have been difficult to determine the level of
expropriation since the pre-conspiracy pricing would have been
negotiated between parties possessing market power.52
¶48

Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Soundview Technologies, Inc., which
transpired more than two decades after Shapiro, demonstrates both the
persistence of the underlying issues and the lack of legal guidance that
emerged during that time period.53 Soundview involves a fact pattern
similar to that in the IP hypothetical.54 Soundview held a patent on a
technology necessary to implement the V-chip standard55 that became
effective in 2000 for televisions manufactured for sale in the United
States. Sony and its co-plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that
Soundview’s patent was invalid.56 Soundview alleged in its antitrust
¶49

48

See 472 F. Supp. 636 (D. Md. 1979).
Id. at 664.
50
Id. at 641. Finally, the court held that construing standing requirements
narrowly was appropriate given the plaintiff’s ability to obtain relief through an
infringement suit. Id. at 661. The court voiced concern about the use or abuse
of antitrust actions by disgruntled patent holders who were unable to negotiate a
price they deemed appropriate. In fact, the court felt market negotiations should
be relied upon in the absence of a conspiracy. Id. at 662–63.
51
Id. at 662–64.
52
Id. at 663.
53
See Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Soundview Techs., Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 180 (D.
Conn. 2001).
54
See discussion supra Part II.A.
55
Soundview, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 181(“[D]evice mandated by the FCC to be
included in all television sets . . . to allow parents to block [objectionable]
programming.”).
56
Id.
49
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counterclaim that Sony, other television manufacturers, and an industry
trade association, conspired to fix the prices at which they would be
willing to license Soundview’s patented technology and to boycott
Soundview if it demanded higher prices.57 The counter-defendants
sought to dismiss the antitrust counterclaims arguing that the requisite
antitrust injury was lacking.58 The district court found that antitrust
injury was adequately alleged and denied the motion to dismiss.59
The court’s discussion raises several important issues relating to
the treatment of buyer price-fixing involving intellectual property. First,
Sony argued that Soundview’s basic collective monopsony theory is
“predicated upon production reductions, resulting in higher consumer
prices.”60 In response, Sony claimed that consumers would enjoy a
lower price and that the number of television sets sold would not be
reduced, so there was no consumer harm attendant to a decrease in input
price.61 The court noted that “[n]othing in the counterclaims alleged here
indicated that Sony and the counterclaim defendants are producing fewer
television sets, or that their conspiracy was to do so.”62 It is with that
statement, however, that the court concluded its discussion regarding
static harm to consumers.
¶50

The court then focused upon the alleged dynamic harm, which
ultimately provided the basis for denying the motion to dismiss.
Soundview argued that buyer price-fixing would diminish incentives for
future innovation because the inventors would anticipate lower rewards
from innovative activity.63 In response, Sony claimed that buyers had no
incentive to induce a decrease in the innovation upon which they
depend.64 The court seemed more persuaded by Soundview’s harm to
innovation argument than by Sony’s argument that output would not fall.
The court held that the “the all-or-nothing price set by these colluding
purchasers can depress the price below the optimal price that would
obtain if usual market forces . . . were at work. The price to consumers
does not decrease, but there may be social welfare consequences in the
¶51

57

Id. Based on an alleged telephone conversation the plaintiffs had with a
representative of one of the defendants, the plaintiff in Soundview asserted that
the defendants agreed to a five cent licensing fee. In contrast, the defendants
argued that the five cent figure was merely the opinion of one of the
manufacturers’ representatives concerning what constituted a reasonable price.
Id. at 183.
58
Id. at 181.
59
Id. at 186.
60
Id. at 185.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
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long run, because suppliers will leave the industry (or, as Soundview has
it, will cease to innovate and invent).”65
Based on the economic analysis presented previously, the per se
treatment of buyer price-fixing in intellectual property settings would be
warranted on normative grounds unless intellectual property has
characteristics that would alter this analysis. The court’s ruling in
Soundview arguably suggests that intellectual property may be different
because it frequently presents settings in which (1) price will decrease
and output will increase (e.g., sellers have market power), and (2) buyer
price-fixing will potentially reduce future innovation. The implication,
although not the actual ruling, is that when the conflicting effects are
both present, balancing rather than per se condemnation may be
warranted.66
¶52

Finally, Adaptive Power Solutions, LLC v. Hughes Missile
Systems Co. underscores the inherent difficulty in weighing current
versus future effects in price-fixing settings.67 The court’s unwillingness
to consider possible future effects enabled it to avoid any weighing
issues. In taking this approach, the court issued a simple but
substantively unsatisfying ruling.
¶53

In Adaptive Power Solutions, the only two buyers of a power
supply system for the AMRAAM missile, Hughes and Raytheon, were
accused of conspiring to drive Adaptive Power Solutions (APS), one of
two suppliers of this system, out of the market by refusing to buy from
APS.68 More specifically, APS alleged a concerted refusal to deal in an
effort “to punish APS for attempting to raise prices”69 and “a price-fixing
conspiracy . . . to drive it [APS] from the A3 power supply market as
punishment for attempting to raise its price for A3s.”70 For summary
judgment purposes a conspiracy was assumed.71 The court analyzed the
allegation pertaining to the refusal to deal under a rule of reason standard
because it held that the antitrust allegation fell outside of the categories
¶54

65

Id.
Ultimately, however, the court’s antitrust ruling focused on a different issue.
After rejecting the television manufacturers’ motion to dismiss the antitrust
claim, the court granted their motion for summary judgment of noninfringement. Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Soundview Techs., Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 164
(D. Conn. 2002). The court subsequently dismissed Soundview’s antitrust
claims for lack of standing. Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Soundview Techs., Inc., 281 F.
Supp. 2d 399 (D. Conn. 2003).
67
141 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 1998).
68
See id.
69
Id. at 949.
70
Id. at 950.
71
Id. at 949.
66
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reserved for per se treatment, i.e., no disadvantaging of a horizontal
competitor was involved.72 The price fixing allegation was summarily
dismissed. The court explained, “[t]he defect in this argument is a
factual one. This is not a case in which competitors try to fix their
prices. This is a case in which manufacturers refuse to deal with a highpriced supplier.”73
In examining the merits of APS’s refusal to deal allegation under
a rule of reason, the court emphasized that shortly after APS exited the
market two other suppliers nominally entered the market.74 One month
after APS departed, its successor, SoraPower, to whom it sold its assets
needed to manufacture A3s, entered the market.75 At about that time,
Raytheon awarded a contract to ST Keltec for A3s. 76 As noted by the
court though, it took ST Keltec “four to ten months after APS left the
market” before it became “qualified or operational.”77 The court
therefore found only a temporary harm to market competition and
concluded that it was an insufficient basis upon which to find an antitrust
violation.78 The standard the court applied was that to constitute “an
injury to competition, the restraint must be ‘of significant magnitude,’
and ‘more than trivial.’”79
¶55

It appears that the court evaluated the price-fixing allegation
solely as a means by which the conspirators could drive APS out of the
market and not as an independent allegation. That is, the court did not
appear to view a lowered price as the end to which the refusal to deal
would be the means.80 One wonders, for example, whether the pricefixing allegation would have at least survived summary judgment if APS
had lowered its price and Raytheon had accepted it, especially if the final
price ended up lower than the original power supply system price.81
Further, there appears to be no evidence in the case of non-price
¶56

72

Id. at 949–50 (citing Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery &
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985)).
73
Adaptive Power Solutions, 141 F.3d at 950.
74
Id. at 949.
75
Id. APS did not sell SoraPower its inventory of completed A3s. Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 952.
78
Id.
79
Id. (internal citations omitted).
80
The case includes insufficient discussion to determine whether the court
adopted a narrow view of price-fixing or whether the price-fixing allegation
failed because the allegation took a peculiar form which focused on a
punishment versus a lower price objective.
81
See Adaptive Power Solutions, 141 F.3d at 947, 949 (the prices APS originally
demanded were much higher than the original system price, suggesting that a
lower than original price outcome was unlikely).
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motivations for refusing to deal, such as a concern with the quality of the
APS-built A3s. If a price-fixing conspiracy could have been established,
the court would likely have ruled this conspiracy illegal per se under
Mandeville Island.82
The court’s narrow treatment of the price-fixing allegation likely
reflected its assessment that the alleged conduct did not make “economic
sense.”83 The court held that it would be “counter-intuitive” for “two
consumers . . . to punish [a supplier] by creating, at least temporarily,
monopoly power in the remaining supplier.”84 The court also cited a
prior Ninth Circuit ruling, which stated that “it would be ‘illogical’ for a
large firm to restrict competition in a market for services which the large
firm requires.”85 Ultimately, the court was unconvinced that Raytheon
and Hughes punished APS in order to threaten other suppliers that did
not offer sufficiently low prices.86 By crediting the defendants’ argument
that entry had occurred while discounting the plaintiff’s argument that
long-term price disciplining effects would result, the court revealed a
strong presumption in favor of current actual effects when balanced
against future theoretical effects. Although such a determination might
be necessary during a trial on the merits, it was arguably premature to
reject the plaintiff’s argument during summary judgment.
¶57

In stark contrast to the Soundview court’s more tempered view—
that parties may not always behave rationally or have complete
information—the court in Adaptive Power Solutions held that parties
would usually act in their long-term interest. The particular difficulties
in assessing competitive effects in intellectual property-based settings
will be further addressed subsequently.
¶58

B. Balancing in Non-Price-Fixing Settings
The issues surrounding buyer price-fixing in intellectual property
settings exemplify both the difficulty and importance of incorporating
innovation effects into antitrust analysis. This section briefly considers
two non-price-fixing examples characterized by similar struggles:
mergers and monopolization. In each context, the decision-maker—
whether it is an antitrust agency or the court—must determine how to
¶59

82

See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
236 (1948).
83
Adaptive Power Solutions, 141 F.3d at 952 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Tech. Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468 (1992)) (“Antitrust claims must
make economic sense.”) .
84
Adaptive Power Solutions, 141 F.3d at 952.
85
Id. (citing Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208,
211 (9th Cir. 1987)).
86
Adaptive Power Solutions, 141 F.3d at 952–53.
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incorporate great uncertainty regarding innovation effects into its
analysis. As in the buyer price-fixing context, questions regarding who
bears the burden of proof and how that burden is discharged figure
prominently.
Mergers. In the 1990s, the antitrust agencies began challenging
acquisitions owing, in part, to potential harm to “innovation markets.”
These markets were defined in terms of “research and development
directed to particular new or improved goods or processes.”87 The
defining feature of such markets is that they are for goods or services not
already in existence at the time of the antitrust inquiry. The innovation
methodology evaluates “the effects of a hypothetical merger on R&D”
but one could use the approach to evaluate other arrangements.88 At its
core, innovation market analysis reflects the recognition that “[t]he
equivalence of the downstream and upstream [market] analyses breaks
down when a merger alters incentives for innovation, which affects the
cost structure of the firms or the development of new products. In this
instance, downstream output market analysis fails to capture fully all of
the economic consequences resulting from the merger.”89
¶60

In re Ciba-Geigy illustrates the “innovation market” approach
and involves the highly concentrated market for research and
development of gene therapy. The merging parties were “the two
leading commercial developers of gene therapy technologies and control
critical gene therapy proprietary portfolios, including patents, patent
applications, and know-how.”90 The merger was challenged on multiple
grounds including: “reduce[d] innovation competition among researchers
and developers of gene therapy products” and “creat[ion of] a
disincentive in the merged firm to license intellectual property rights to
¶61

87

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 11 (1995) [hereinafter IP
GUIDELINES] (emphasis added), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm. See generally Richard J.
Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in
Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569
(1994); Dennis A. Yao & Susan S. DeSanti, Innovation Issues Under the 1992
Merger Guidelines, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 505 (1993).
88
Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 87, at 594. The following is a “rough guide to
the innovation market approach”: identify overlapping research and
development (R&D) activities of the merging firms; identify alternative sources
of R&D; evaluate actual and potential competition from downstream products;
assess the increase in concentration in R&D and competitive effects on
investment in R&D; assess R&D efficiencies. Id. at 594–97.
89
Id. at 583.
90
In re Ciba-Geigy, 123 F.T.C. 842, 842–53 (1997), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/04/c3725cmp.pdf.
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or collaborate with other companies compared to premerger
incentives.”91 The case settled with the merging parties agreeing to a
series of divestitures of businesses and licensing of intellectual
property.92 The antitrust agencies have been relatively sparing in their
use of innovation markets and generally limited its use to circumstances
where identifiable participants in a given market were comparatively
better situated for innovation, such as with respect to pharmaceutical
drug approval pipelines or where research and development expenditures
were shown to have a strong link to current market shares.93
Even such relatively targeted applications drew considerable
criticism from the antitrust community, which may have interpreted these
early actions as a harbinger of more aggressive uses in challenging
proposed acquisitions. Some critics questioned how innovation markets
were connected to product markets in which the effects of the acquisition
were comparatively better understood; they also questioned whether
traditional metrics such as market share could be meaningfully
deployed.94 In any event, the use of the innovation market concept in
mergers has arguably not been expanded.95
¶62

The uncertainty attendant to the use of innovation markets in
mergers and the relative inability of the antitrust agencies to otherwise
gain traction on this issue would not appear to bode well for balancing
price and innovation effects in the price-fixing contexts this iBrief
addresses. It is important to recognize, however, that merger analysis is
forward-looking, seeking to predict future restraints of trade resulting
from the transaction. Whereas the analysis of price-fixing is at least
partially backward-looking, focusing on already apparent effects. Thus,
documentable evidence may exist of the effects of buyer price-fixing on
innovation inputs, e.g., R&D levels or employment levels.
¶63

91

Id. at 852.
Id. at 853–86.
93
See, e.g., In re Glaxo PLC, 119 F.T.C. 815 (1995) (consent order); Complaint,
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 1:93-CV-530 (D. Del. Nov. 16, 1993),
1993 WL 13610315.
94
Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to
Merger Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19 (1995) (“Neither economic theory nor
any factual analysis of the connections between market structure, R&D, and
innovation provides a persuasive basis for the innovation market approach.” Id.
at 20.); see also Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of the SchumpterArrow Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV.
393, 399–401 (2008) (surveying criticisms of innovation markets).
95
See Willard K. Tom & Richard J. Gilbert, Is Innovation King at the Antitrust
Agencies?: The Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 43 (2001) (“[I]nnovation concerns were decisive in only a few
cases.”).
92
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Several high-profile monopolization cases also required courts to
grapple with assessing competitive effects, of which, harm to innovation
was a major component. Two such cases are In re Intel96 and United
States v. Microsoft.97 John Lopatka and William Page characterize the
applications of antitrust in these cases as “us[ing] the notion of harm to
innovation to shift the burden to the defendant to justify conduct that
harms a competitor.”98 They further argue that “to relax the antitrust
plaintiff’s obligation to prove harm to competition, particularly when the
conduct provides immediate consumer benefits, is unwarranted.”99 They
then conclude, “[e]ven if a practice confers no immediate and
discernable benefits, prohibiting it in hopes of promoting future
innovation is problematic if the kind of practice at issue usually increases
consumer welfare.”100 Lopatka and Page’s general frustration regarding
the manner in which innovation harm is assessed and weighed has
appeal. Within the price-fixing context at issue in this iBrief, the
challenge is still greater because the static impact of such price-fixing
upon consumer welfare is not well-recognized.
¶64

The trend in antitrust law generally is the incorporation of
innovation effects into the overall analysis. Some would argue that in
some cases (merger) that effect is undervalued and counts only as a
supplemental argument.
Some would argue that in other cases
(monopolization), the innovation effect is often presumed and overstated.
The problem both positions appear to highlight is the absence of some
effort to balance. The balancing recommended in Part IV does not
always require full-fledged economic analysis and weighing of all
factors, but still offers a more nuanced treatment of the sometimes
conflicting price and innovation effects.
¶65

IV. RECOGNIZING EFFICIENCIES WITHIN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SETTINGS
Buyer price-fixing of intellectual property introduces both
potential benefits and harms to social welfare. In terms of benefits, such
collective buyer action offers a possibility of superior resource allocation
¶66

96

In re Intel Corp., 128 F.T.C. 213, 224–29 (1999), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/06/intelcmp.pdf.
97
See generally 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
98
See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Monopolization, Innovation, and
Consumer Welfare, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 367, 372 (2001). Lopatka and Page
focus their analysis upon Sherman Act section 2 (monopolization) offenses,
though they believe it also could be applied to section 1 offenses “such as claims
of exclusion through exclusive dealing.” Id. at 386 n.141.
99
Id. at 372.
100
Id.
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and lower consumer prices and, hence, an efficiency. In terms of harms,
such conduct also carries the likelihood of reduced innovation. Because
the relative importance of these two factors is uncertain, per se treatment
of buyer price-fixing in intellectual property settings is inappropriate.
Unfortunately, balancing within this context is inherently difficult and
the contours of an alternative approach are not straightforward. As a
consequence, this iBrief eschews the actual balancing test that normally
characterizes rule of reason evaluation.101 Instead, it proposes a coarse
screen that relies, where possible, on inquiries into the presence of price
efficiencies and innovation reductions as revealed through investments or
other indicia of innovation activity. Despite being characterized by an
attenuated form of the presumption embodied in the existing per se rule
against buyer price-fixing, the proposed screen constitutes a preliminary
and salutary departure from the current, unduly harsh per se treatment.
As such, it can serve to prevent condemnation where the conduct might
be procompetitive on balance.

A. Recommendation
The current per se rule against buyer price-fixing, as applied to
intellectual property, effectively allows even theoretical innovation
harms to trump all price efficiencies. In contrast, the proposed screen
would enhance welfare by avoiding the per se rule’s heavy-handed,
lexicographic preference for innovation harm over actual price
efficiencies. At the same time, the proposed analysis, given its
conservative nature, does not unduly jeopardize consumer welfare. The
proposed screen reflects economic theory, which suggests that lowering
price in intellectual property settings will improve price efficiency but
will reduce expected returns to the sellers (innovators) and lower
investment in innovation.
Notably though, by requiring some
demonstrable impact, the screen has the additional safeguard of applying
only where the economic theory is corroborated.
¶67

Consistent with general antitrust pleading requirements, the
proposed screen requires the plaintiff to bear the initial burden of
demonstrating both that a conspiracy exists and that the plaintiff meets
the requirements for standing (assuming a private, rather than
governmental, plaintiff). If these threshold conditions are satisfied, the
burden then shifts to the defendants to demonstrate either that their joint
conduct has had only a de minimis price effect or that they substantially
passed the benefit of their cartel activity through to the end consumers.
¶68

101

See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 257 (suggesting that balancing could be
avoided through condemnation of restraints for which less-restrictive
alternatives are available).
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If the defendants make such a showing, they prevail unless the plaintiff
can show a non-trivial reduction in innovation. A discussion providing
greater detail regarding the nature of these legal burdens follows.
De minimis Price Effect on Seller. The defendants can establish
a de minimis price effect through market share evidence or actual
evidence of effect or some combination thereof.
Economic
understanding suggests that with insubstantial market share, there is
likely to be no price effect. In keeping with the conservative nature of
this screen, only a showing of a small market share, absent other
contradictory evidence, will satisfy the no-real-harm-to-the-seller
element. As a working assumption, this iBrief proposes a sliding scale
wherein the lower the market share, the less actual evidence of no price
effect must be produced by the defendants. Nonetheless, defendants will
be required to proffer evidence regarding price effect despite having
market shares below those normally equated with market power.102
¶69

Substantial Pass-Through to Consumer. When a price effect
exists and the buyers are intermediate goods producers, the proposed
screen also allows the buyers to show that consumer welfare was
enhanced by the reduced price buyers received.103 More specifically, if
more than a de minimis price effect is present, the burden falls on the
buyer (antitrust defendant) to demonstrate it has substantially passed
through its savings to the consumers. Direct evidence of pass-through
can come from comparing consumer prices before and after the
conspiracy. Even when no meaningful “before” exists, the likelihood of
pass-through may be suggested by retrospective evidence that other cost
reductions were passed along to consumers.
¶70

Many commentators believe that pass-through is greater when
the intermediate buyers encounter greater competition in their
¶71

102

Because horizontal price fixing is condemned as per se illegal, market share
thresholds have not been relevant in such actions. Therefore, one must look
elsewhere for points of reference including, for example, monopolization cases.
“[M]arket shares above 70 percent will likely establish prima facie monopoly
power, market shares between 50-70 percent will likely place a company close
to the threshold for establishing monopoly power, and market shares below 50
percent are very unlikely to result in a finding of monopoly power.” Brian A.
Facey & Dany H. Assaf, Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance in Canada,
the United States, and the European Union: A Survey, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 513,
536 n.100 (2002) (citations omitted) (citing ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, 234–37 (5th ed. 2002)).
103
Although some commentators have argued for a standard that recognizes
producer as well as consumer welfare, this position has not been widely
accepted by the courts or the antitrust agencies and is not adopted herein.
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downstream market.104 Although this relationship has intuitive appeal,
economic theory suggests that in many market situations (e.g., depending
on the characteristics of demand), firms with market power will pass
through more than firms in competitive situations.105 Thus, the market
power of the buyers in their downstream seller roles does not appear to
reliably indicate the extent of the pass-through of price reductions.
Unfortunately, the most common use of pass-through in antitrust
occurs in merger review, which provides limited useful guidance for this
discussion. It is in the merger context that former Federal Trade
Commission Chairman Robert Pitofsky offered his oft-cited
characterization of the pass-through defense as a “killer qualification”
owing to the considerable difficulties associated with proof.106 Proving
pass-through, when it actually occurs, should be significantly less
burdensome in a price-fixing context than in a merger context for two
reasons. First, there will usually be direct retrospective evidence of passthrough in the price-fixing context. Second, indirect evidence, such as
previous examples of how variable cost reductions have resulted in lower
selling prices, will not suffer from the confounding effect of a change in
market structure that is inherent to the merger context.
¶72

Assuming a pass-through defense, to whom should it be
available: individual firms, the conspiratorial group, or both? This
proposal would permit individual firms, but not the group, to proffer
such a defense. Because each downstream market seller normally prices
independently from the other sellers, the degree of pass-through may
vary across firms. Therefore, two problems exist in characterizing a
group-based pass-through standard. First, some firms passing through a
low percentage of the price reductions gained via the buyer conspiracy
could avoid liability if others in the group pass through high percentages
of the price reductions. This free-riding on the pass-through of others
could result in many socially undesirable outcomes including suboptimal
pass-through or downstream price-fixing to ensure legally sufficient
¶73
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GUIDELINES ON THE ASSESSMENT OF HORIZONTAL
MERGERS UNDER THE COUNCIL REG. ON THE CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS
BETWEEN UNDERTAKINGS (2004/C 31/03) (Section V discussing countervailing
buyer power), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52004XC0205(02):EN:NOT.
105
See Paul Yde & Michael Vita, Merger Efficiencies: The ‘Passing-On’
Fallacy, 20 ANTITRUST 59, 60 (2006) (“[Economic theory suggests that f]irms
with market power have a substantial incentive to reduce their prices when their
costs fall, and this incentive increases with the degree of market power.”).
106
Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised Merger Enforcement in a Global
Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 207 (1992).
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pass-through.107 Second, a group-based standard limits a buyer’s ability
to reduce its potential liability by taking consumer welfare enhancing
actions.
The next question to address is the percentage of pass-through
needed to establish this defense. The overall welfare effect of an
intermediate good price reduction depends on, among other things, the
characteristics of demand and the market structure of the downstream
market, which in turn becomes partially manifest in the pass-through of
the reduction to the end-consumer. Both the price efficiency and the
distribution of the benefits between producers and end-consumers are
important in making welfare judgments.
If the pass-through is
considerable, perhaps fifty percent, then a substantial portion of the
benefit from the buyer conspiracy will flow directly to the consumers;
though a fifty percent pass-through also implies that firms are enjoying
substantial benefits as well. Thus, determining the appropriate passthrough standard involves both economic analysis and a policy
¶74

107

A related issue concerns whether it is more likely that competitors will
collude downstream if they have colluded upstream. As a purely logistical
matter, the creation and/or functioning of a conspiracy upstream would seem to
increase the ease of re-creating such a conspiracy downstream. See, e.g., BLAIR
& HARRISON, supra note 17, at 123–24 (discussing factors contributing to the
formation of downstream conspiracies). It is important, however, not to
overstate the true magnitude of that risk under this proposal either in terms of
the harm or the likelihood of a downstream conspiracy. In terms of the harm,
the requirement of substantial pass-through limits the ability of the conspirators
to collude downstream. Even if they did so collude, the consumers may still
fare better on net.
In terms of the likelihood of a downstream conspiracy, several factors
warrant consideration. By definition, this risk is restricted to intermediate
goods. If the conspirators are effectively end-users, no downstream market is at
risk for collusion. If, however, the conspirators are intermediate good
purchasers, the issue becomes how ongoing collusion among buyers in an
upstream market affects the likelihood of collusion by the same firms in the
downstream market where the firms are sellers. It is generally thought that prior
collusion in a market increases the likelihood that future collusion can be
supported in that same market. This risk of increased collusion, however,
should be weaker across markets for two reasons. First, the common firms may
be competing with different firms in the downstream market than in the
upstream market. Second, the market structure is also likely to be different
between the two markets. Assuming intermediate goods purchasers, upstream
conspirators do not always compete, either directly or indirectly, in the
downstream market. Therefore, the enhanced likelihood of collusion
downstream remains unclear. Moreover, a history of collusion in one market
does not carry the comparable implications as a history of collusion in a
different market. Both types of prior conduct are relevant, but the former is
clearly of greater significance than the latter.
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determination of the relevant value attributed to consumer versus
producer surplus. The economic analysis can be complex if done
precisely, and resolving the policy issue will be contentious. As a
starting point, this iBrief proposes a standard requiring that the
incremental benefits to consumers exceed those to the firms. Given that
the incremental price efficiency loss from the intellectual property buyer
conspiracies at issue is theoretically zero, any significant flow of benefits
to the consumers would improve their static welfare.
The question then becomes if substantial pass-through of
conspiracy-induced savings is required, would buyers even form the
arguably efficiency-enhancing cartels at issue? The answer is yes for
several reasons. First, substantial pass-through to consumers does not
mean that the conspirators retain no benefits or only trivial benefits from
the conspiracy-induced price reduction. Second, numerous business
reasons exist why the conspirators (acting as downstream sellers) would
want lower prices available to their consumers. The buyers may be able
to generate greater profits from the higher volume of sales induced by the
lower consumer price (even assuming 100 percent pass-through). Third,
the upstream conspirators may sell additional goods that are
complementary to the good whose input is at issue in the conspiracy.
¶75

Establishment of a Not Insubstantial Reduction in Innovation. If
the defendant can demonstrate that the buyer conspiracy resulted in
either a negligible price effect (de minimis effect) on the seller or a price
benefit to the consumer (substantial pass-through), the plaintiff must then
establish a not insubstantial reduction in innovation in order to prevail.
Although a reduction in innovation does not necessarily imply a
reduction in welfare, reductions in innovation have been typically treated
as harms, and to be conservative, this iBrief adopts this perspective in its
recommendations.
¶76

Arguments intended to establish or dispute a reduction in
innovation will likely fall into two related categories: theoretical
arguments linking various observable features of the situation in question
to their innovation effect, and facts that provide direct and indirect
evidence of an innovation effect, often buttressed by theory. Plaintiffs
will argue that an effective conspiracy reduces the anticipated future
rewards to innovation and, therefore, reduces innovation investment and
ultimately innovation itself. Although directionally correct, this general
argument does not by itself establish a not insubstantial reduction in
innovation. Further, one can expect a number of partially countering
theoretical arguments suggesting that future innovation investment is
unlikely to be substantially affected by a given buyer conspiracy. For
example, defendants may argue that the buyer conspiracy formed under
unusual circumstances (e.g., government imposition of the V-chip
¶77
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standard, which was important in the Soundview case) that are unlikely to
be repeated later, and hence that investment—which may respond to
anticipated reductions in innovation rents—would not be affected.
Defendants might also argue that because seller rents are commonly
maximized by limiting the number of licensees and/or pitting licensees
against one another, the likelihood of a buyer conspiracy is diminished.
The defendants are also likely to argue that it would not be in their own
interest to reduce the flow of innovation. For example, in Adaptive
Power Solutions and in Soundview the buyers argued, respectively, that it
was contrary to their interests to price in such a way as to reduce the
number of suppliers in the market or to reduce future innovation.108 As
discussed in Part III, such an argument has limited force.
In light of such arguments and counterarguments, this iBrief
would not permit theory alone to establish a not insubstantial reduction
in innovation. Moreover, if merely arguing the directional effect of the
reduction in incentives suffices to meet the plaintiff’s burden, then such a
lax standard would effectively reinstate per se condemnation of buyer
price-fixing. Therefore, some level of empirical evidence is also
required to support the alleged reduction in innovation. Such support
could consist of concrete evidence of actual reduced innovation
investment or some other indicia of innovation reduction. Reduced
innovation investment may be difficult to interpret, as changes in
industry conditions will change innovation investment for reasons
unrelated to the conduct at issue. Nonetheless, a company could
demonstrate that its investment in research and development has
historically had a constant relationship, such as a set percentage, with the
company’s current profit. Decreased profits due to the buyer conspiracy
would reduce current profit and would, given the company’s history,
translate directly into reduced innovation investment. Such evidence is
less likely to be prone to litigation-strategic investment decisions.
Similarly, it might be possible for a plaintiff to demonstrate that its
competitors have decreased their innovation investments. More indirect
metrics, such as a decline in the sales of equipment used as inputs to
innovation, may be helpful in establishing this reduction. Reductions can
also be inferred from the actions of buyers who might reduce their
investment in capacity or in assets complementary to innovation because
they anticipate reduced seller innovation. The characteristics of the
innovation process may also be relevant. It is possible, for example, that
¶78
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See Brief of Defendants/Appellees Raytheon Company and Hughes Missiles
Systems Company at 51, Adaptive Power Solutions, LLC v. Hughes Missile
Sys. Co., 141 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-55010), 1997 WL 33633635;
Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Soundview Techs., Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 180, 185 (D. Conn.
2001).
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the efficient scale for innovation would dictate no post-conspiracy
reductions in innovation.
Another evidentiary question concerns the weight accorded
individual firm versus industry evidence. Reductions in incentives
should affect all potential innovators in the industry, not just the seller
targeted by the buyer conspiracy. Industry-level evidence may be
preferable to plaintiff-specific evidence, which is more susceptible to
gerrymandering through litigation-driven investment behavior.
Unfortunately, while industry-level evidence appears to be most credible,
for practical evidentiary reasons firm-specific evidence may sometimes
constitute the bulk of the empirical evidence. Namely, the plaintiff has
best access to its own investment information and other potential
innovators are likely to be secretive regarding their innovation
investments.
¶79

Finally, under the proposed screen the plaintiff can always
prevail by demonstrating the requisite harm to innovation even if the
defendants have demonstrated only a de minimus price effect on the
plaintiff. Rather than relying solely upon economic theory, which
suggests that innovation incentives should not decrease if there is no
price effect, this iBrief adopts a cautious approach and preserves this
alternative channel for the plaintiff.
¶80

Industry-Wide Price Effects. A buyer price-fixing conspiracy
that disadvantages horizontal non-conspirator competitors may
undermine downstream competition, even if it increases price efficiency.
If horizontal competitors of the conspirators are excluded from the price
reductions flowing from the conspiracy, then those excluded competitors
may be disadvantaged relative to the conspirators. In the extreme, the
disadvantaged competitors may exit the market resulting in less
competition downstream. This could ultimately harm consumers by
causing prices to increase, notwithstanding the initial period of increased
price efficiency owing to pass-through. Importantly though, assuming
non-collusion in the downstream market and sufficient numbers of
upstream buyers, the fact that some non-members may be disadvantaged
would not necessarily harm consumers.
¶81

Antitrust suits could be brought against the conspirators if the
benefits of the exclusive deal were not shared more broadly.
Nonetheless, to avoid the specter of such anticompetitive effects, this
iBrief would require that any buyer price-fixing gains be shared
throughout the entire market.
This requirement eliminates the
disadvantaging of any horizontal competitors as a result of the pricefixing activity. In other words, the buyer conspiracy’s demands must
¶82
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concern general price decreases or they will likely be subject to per se
treatment.
Other Considerations. Under the recommended approach, both
parties have opportunities to rebut various presumptions. Much of the
rebuttal evidence may entail comparing pre- and post-conspiracy market
outcomes. Because the timing of both the identification of the
conspiracy and the initiation of the lawsuit can have implications for
what evidence is available, timing issues can also influence whether the
burden of proof can be met. When a conspiracy is identified early, price
effects are probably easier to demonstrate relative to innovation effects.
Hence, one might argue that such cases would favor the defendant,
particularly when the conspirator’s market share is insubstantial;
however, given a more sizable conspiracy, the defendant will need to
demonstrate either no price effect or substantial pass-through. Both
factors are likely to be somewhat harder to demonstrate persuasively
with evidence drawn from a limited time period. Thus, even though the
innovation effect will also be harder to demonstrate, when higher market
shares are involved, the plaintiff may be favored.
¶83

An alternative approach, which would place a greater initial
burden on the plaintiff, would require the plaintiff to establish a not
insubstantial market share and to demonstrate a negative price effect.
The defendant could then rebut with a pass-through defense.109 This
alternative would be more lenient with respect to buyer price-fixing in
intellectual property settings.
¶84

Although the instant proposal accounts for many elements, it
does not entail fully weighing benefits and harms. Nonetheless, it
constitutes an incremental improvement over a per se rule. Striking the
correct balance when assigning burdens of proof is not easy, but
experience will shape its evolution. For example, over time, one should
expect the courts to further develop appropriate indicia of innovation
harm.110 Unfortunately, many of these relevant indicia are likely to
address incentives to innovate rather than the innovation harm itself. It is
extremely difficult to establish the final link between reduced incentive
to innovate and innovation harm. As a practical matter, if proving
innovation harm is too difficult, one could relax the proof required or
even reassign the burden of proof and require the defendant to
demonstrate no innovation harm.
Given the inherent difficulty
associated with assessing innovation harm and price efficiencies and
¶85
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One could also alter the market share threshold for cases that involve recently
established conspiracies.
110
Such a comparable evolution has characterized merger review as well as the
antitrust treatment of vertical relationships.

2011

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 004

society’s lack of experience and knowledge in implementing such tradeoffs, this iBrief proposes incremental rather than radical reforms.

B. Noneconomic Considerations
Part II explored the need for antitrust to adopt a more nuanced
approach to evaluating buyer conspiracies involving intellectual
property. Part III underscored the difficulty, albeit not insurmountable,
of balancing innovation harm and price efficiency benefits that are
central to any more refined antitrust approach. Part IV(A) recommended
one such approach based on economic reasoning. In its weakest form,
the argument is that buyer conspiracies within this limited setting are not
the unambiguous harm that warrants per se treatment. In its strongest
form, the argument is that procompetitive efficiencies attendant to this
suspect conduct would be lost with per se condemnation.
¶86

The remainder of Part IV evaluates whether either of two key
noneconomic arguments justify retaining per se treatment despite the
economic arguments favoring more lenient treatment. The first argument
is that antitrust law simply should not recognize price efficiencies
resulting from buyer price-fixing. The second is that conflicts between
antitrust law and the patent system should be resolved in favor of the
patent system. Although both arguments warrant serious consideration,
ultimately, neither justifies foregoing the potential improvements in
consumer welfare that a more lenient treatment of such conspiracies in
the intellectual property setting promotes.
¶87

1. Should Price Efficiencies from Joint Action Go Unrecognized?
¶88
Part I identified several circumstances in which inherently
suspect conduct received rule of reason rather than per se treatment.
Those circumstances do not, however, include the price efficiencies
associated with buyer price-fixing in the presence of a flat supply curve.
Although such buyer conspiracies regarding intellectual property pricing
may harm innovative efficiency, that harm cannot justify nonrecognition
of price efficiencies because innovative efficiency harm need not always
outweigh the price efficiency benefit. Hence, the argument for ignoring
price efficiencies must rely upon disqualifying those efficiencies from
consideration rather than upon some dominant net efficiency calculus.
This section argues that no such basis for disregarding price efficiencies
arises from the core values of antitrust law.
In recent years, antitrust law has continued to demonstrate an
increased willingness to entertain various efficiency-based defenses.111
¶89
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See discussion infra ¶¶ 93–95; see also Andrew I. Gavil, A First Look at the
Powell Papers: Sylvia and the Process of Change in the Supreme Court, 17
ANTITRUST 8, 8 (2002) (discussing the historical origins of how antitrust’s
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This willingness has manifested itself in a reduction in the types of
conduct receiving per se treatment and a concomitant increase in the
conduct evaluated under a rule of reason. Though the courts have not
fully engaged the specific type of efficiency argument this iBrief
advocates, two lines of reasoning could be advanced for why the courts
should not be receptive to it. The first reason, as discussed previously, is
the overly simplistic appeal of the argument (exacerbated by vaguely
worded case law) that buyer and seller price-fixing warrant similar
treatment.112 A second reason, addressed here, is the ostensible hostility
of American antitrust law to countervailing power arguments, which, in
effect, would potentially legitimate otherwise competitively suspect
conduct mitigating market power elsewhere in the market. The depth
and wisdom of that hostility is questioned here.
The source of the potentially procompetitive effects of buyer
price-fixing within this context stems from the ability of buyers to
exercise countervailing power against the seller. Towards that end, it is
important to understand why the exercise of countervailing power
through the otherwise clearly suspect—if not illegal—conduct of such
buyer price-fixing conspiracies should nonetheless be countenanced in
limited circumstances. To demonstrate a prominent example wherein the
U.S. government directly supports price-fixing as a mechanism of
countervailing power, this iBrief notes the long-standing American
policy supporting price-fixing among U.S. exporters. It then explores the
numerous ways in which the courts and government already incorporate
countervailing power into antitrust analysis as an offset to otherwise
competitively suspect circumstances within the merger context. Finally,
it briefly discusses arguments by commentators for relaxing certain
antitrust prohibitions against limited forms of conduct that provide
countervailing forces against firms that exercise market power.
¶90

The U.S. federal government has a long-standing policy of
expressly accepting, indeed encouraging, price-fixing conspiracies that
provide countervailing power against foreign market power. As one
commentator has observed:
¶91

America's tolerance for its own export cartels is almost as old as its
antitrust laws. The 1918 Webb-Pomerene Act was avowedly a
license for U.S. exporters to band together to exercise their
collective bargaining power in foreign markets. The justification at

“increasing reliance on per se rules gave way to a decidedly more economic
analytical model, one that has proven to be . . . far more receptive to defendants
asserting defenses based on ‘efficiency.’”).
112
See discussion supra Part II.A.
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the time was that small U.S. firms needed mutual support to counter
the economic power of dominant foreign buying cartels.113

This policy has received a more recent imprimatur in the form of
the 1982 Export Trading Company (ETC) Act, which grants certificates
permitting some actions that might otherwise be illegal. A recent study
found that from the ETC Act’s inception in 1982 through 2004, “almost
three-quarters of all ETC Certificates grant permission to fix export
prices.”114 No small amount of commerce is affected given that, “exports
by firms covered by ETC Certificates of Review . . . have averaged over
$10 billion per year since 2001.”115
¶92

Consideration of price-fixing within a domestic context also
provides instructive precedent. Not long ago, vertical price-fixing was
condemned as per se illegal, but this principle no longer holds true. Ten
years ago, in State Oil Co. v. Khan, the Supreme Court overruled existing
precedent, and vertical maximum price fixing became subject to a rule of
reason, rather than a per se illegal, standard of review.116 The Court
reaffirmed its reluctance to apply per se rules to restraints “where the
economic impact of certain practices [was] not immediately obvious.”117
In Khan, the Court noted that the precedent it was overruling had
“expressed concern that maximum prices may be set too low for dealers
to offer consumers essential or desired services.”118 Khan rejected this
earlier concern noting that “such conduct, by driving away consumers,
would seem likely to harm manufacturers as well as dealers and
consumers, making it unlikely that a supplier would set such a price as a
matter of business judgment.”119 Khan noted that it was not holding “all
vertical maximum price-fixing [to be] per se lawful. Instead, vertical
maximum price-fixing, like the majority of commercial arrangements
subject to the antitrust laws, should be evaluated under the rule of reason
. . . . [R]ule-of-reason analysis will effectively identify those situations
¶93

113

James R. Atwood, Conflicts of Jurisdiction in the Antitrust Field: The
Example of Export Cartels, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 154–55 (1987).
114
Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, The Economic Impact of the
U.S. Export Trading Company Act, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 343, 362 (2007); see also
Spencer Weber Waller, The Failure of the Export Trading Company Program,
17 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 239, 252 (1992) (“[Analysis of ETC
Certificates from 1982 through 1990 revealed that more than half sought] the
full range of price setting, production restriction, and policing powers normally
associated with cartel behavior.”).
115
Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 114, at 344.
116
522 U.S. 3 (1997).
117
Id. at 10.
118
Id. at 17.
119
Id.
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in which vertical maximum price-fixing amounts to anticompetitive
conduct.”120
The Supreme Court’s 2007 ruling in Leegin Creative Leather
Products v. PSKS overturned precedent and established the applicability
of a rule of reason, rather than per se, standard to minimum vertical price
fixing.121 Leegin is significant for its articulation of the presumptive
applicability of rule of reason analysis within antitrust law and, more
importantly, the unambiguous nature of the anticompetitive effect needed
to overcome that presumption. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
began by noting that the rule of reason is the “usual standard applied to
determine if there is a violation of § 1.”122 A per se standard, Kennedy
continued, relying on prior Supreme Court rulings, is justified if there is
a combination of both “‘manifestly anticompetitive’ effects” and the
“lack [of] . . . any redeeming virtue.”123 Moreover, “departure from the
rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic
effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.”124
¶94

The debate between the majority and the dissent in Leegin
illustrates the diversity of opinion that exists regarding the competitive
effects of vertical minimum price fixing. The majority acknowledged
that “each side of the debate can find sources to support its position.”125
Although noting the “limited” amount of empirical evidence available,
the majority concluded that the evidence “does not suggest efficient uses
of the agreements are infrequent or hypothetical.”126 The dissent, citing
Robert Pitofsky, William Comanor, and Frederic M. Scherer, argued that
the scant amount of evidence in support of efficient uses suggested that
theory, more than evidence, influenced the majority.127 Regardless of
one’s estimation of these changes to vertical price-fixing law, both Khan
and Leegin illustrate the trend in antitrust law away from per se
condemnation and towards a more lenient treatment that acknowledges
previously unrecognized efficiencies from ostensibly suspect conduct.
¶95

Finally, it is also important to recognize the different ways in
which the courts and antitrust agencies already incorporate
countervailing power considerations into their analyses. The most
prominent example is found within the context of merger law. When a
merger is potentially anticompetitive, the merging parties have argued
¶96
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Id. at 22.
See 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
122
Id. at 882.
123
Id. at 886 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
124
Id. at 887 (emphasis added).
125
Id. at 889.
126
Id. at 894 (emphasis added).
127
Id. at 914–17 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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successfully in their defense that the existence of countervailing power
within the marketplace in the form of “buyer power” mitigates the
merged entity’s ability to engage in anticompetitive conduct.128 This
buyer power argument is recognized within the context of both the DOJ
Antitrust Division/Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger
Guidelines and the National Association of Attorneys General Horizontal
Merger Guidelines.129 If the courts and antitrust agencies recognize
buyer power as a mitigating factor to possible anticompetitive effects
when sellers seek to merge, then they also should acknowledge buyer
power’s potential value, or at least lack of harm, within other contexts
such as that at issue here.
A call for a broader use of countervailing powers within antitrust
law has been made most forcefully by Barbara White130 and Warren
Grimes.131 Both build on John Kenneth Galbraith’s seminal articulation
of the countervailing powers concept132 and use this general concept to
advocate specific legal reforms. In particular, both scholars argue that
antitrust law may unnecessarily condemn nominally suspect conduct that
exerts countervailing power against firms with market power.
¶97

White argues that “[c]ountervailing power analysis is . . .
valuable because it provides a legal basis for courts to permit economic
responses by exploited groups that are tailored to the anticompetitive
aspects of otherwise legal behavior.”133 She would uphold the legality of
such restraints in “circumscribed and well-delineated circumstances . . .
even when such restraints conflict with traditional antitrust principles.”134
White, in an approach she describes as emphasizing “context rather than
conduct,” would allow countervailing power restraints that function
competitively.135 She also evaluates many decades of judicial precedent
¶98

128

See generally Robert W. Pratt, The “Sophisticated Buyer” Defense in Merger
Litigation Gains Momentum, 6 ANTITRUST 9 (1992) (delineating several clear
examples wherein buyer power figured prominently in judicial analysis of
challenged mergers).
129
See U.S. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 44, § 2.1; NAAG
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 5.4, available at
http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/at-hmerger_guidelines.pdf.
130
Barbara Ann White, Countervailing Power–Different Rules for Different
Markets? Conduct and Context in Antitrust Law and Economics, 41 DUKE L.J.
1045 (1992).
131
Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act’s Unintended Bias Against Lilliputians:
Small Players’ Collective Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 195 (2001).
132
GALBRAITH, supra note 22, at 10–11; see also supra note 22.
133
White, supra note 130 at 1049.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 1049–50.
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and identifies the persistent, albeit often unacknowledged, use of
countervailing power analysis.136
Grimes thoughtfully critiques the law’s reluctance to allow weak
economic actors to take collective action against firms that wield market
power as frustrating the goals of the Sherman Act. He states the
following:
¶99

Section 1 of the Sherman Act, because of its strong proscription on
cartel conduct, stands in the path of collective action that could
allow the exercise of countervailing power. Unless the small firms
can establish an efficiency defense, collective action will be subject
to the per se rule governing horizontal combinations.137
The result is “anathema to Sherman Act goals.” 138

Both scholars argue that their respective proposals are not only
consistent with core antitrust tenets but are also essential to meaningfully
effectuate those tenets. An important element of their proposals to
permit previously illegal conduct, which exerts valuable countervailing
forces, is that this category of conduct be carefully cabined—a priority
reflected in this iBrief’s recommendation. This recommendation entails
a very narrow use of countervailing power restricted to those cases
wherein it is never price inefficient. Generally speaking, countervailing
power is not always efficient because the effect of the countervailing
force can more than offset the original force (a function of the seller’s
market power) and result in price falling below the competitive price.
With a flat supply curve, buyer power cannot create price inefficiency
because pricing below the competitive level— marginal cost—will result
in no supply at all.139
¶100

2. Should the Patent System Dominate?
¶101
Patent and antitrust law operate in some tension with one
another. Patents induce innovation by providing inventors exclusivity.
That exclusivity, in turn, sometimes enables the patent holder to
monopolize one or more markets. In contrast, a primary purpose of
antitrust law is to maintain competitive markets. Antitrust law defers to
the patent system by respecting the exclusivity granted by patents even
when, for example, it results in supracompetitive pricing. From an
economic vantage point, the difference in social welfare from allowing
136

Id. at 1073–88.
Grimes, supra note 131, at 195; see also Jacobson & Dorman, supra note 33,
at 155 (arguing that monopsony power wielded against monopoly power “will
almost always be beneficial to downstream consumers”).
138
Grimes, supra note 131, at 195.
139
This proposal also cannot be used to endorse supplier conspiracies to
counteract buyer market power. See discussion supra, Part II.B.1 and note 32.
137
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versus disallowing a buyer price-fixing conspiracy in an intellectual
property setting is the net incremental welfare due to more efficient
pricing and the presumed decrease in innovation incentives. As
discussed previously, assessing and then balancing those two effects is
generally a very difficult task.
One response to the difficulty of balancing is to merely establish
as the default position that innovation harm is always presumed greater
than the price efficiencies engendered by buyer price-fixing. Such a
default enshrines a strong deference to the patent system that would
effectively maintain the current per se prohibition against buyer pricefixing by always favoring the patent holder. This outcome avoids the
tough balancing issues by giving short shrift to at least two important
legal developments: the trend in antitrust law favoring more nuanced
and economically-sophisticated analyses when feasible, and the
increasing appreciation that innovation and patents are not synonymous
and that, in fact, they may at times work at cross purposes.
For
example, there is increasing recognition that some patent holders
strategically deploy their rights to hold-up others who may have designed
a product without knowledge that they infringed on a patent that they
could easily have avoided without loss to the design.140 The profits that
those employing such patent litigation strategies obtain seem to arise
more from exploiting the legal system than from harnessing the value
created by the inventive activity. 141
¶102

140

One example of a de facto industry standard, which was allegedly developed,
released and broadly adopted prior to the developer’s knowledge that the
standard involved patented technology, involved Compuserve’s GIF standard
for “file exchange of graphics over the Internet.” Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual
Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889,
1922 (2002). Compuserve released this standard in 1987 and many adopted this
standard through the early 1990s. Unisys had “obtained a patent that arguably
covered the compression algorithm used by the GIF standard” in 1986. Id.
“Unisys kept silent about the patent while the GIF standard gained market share;
whether intentionally or because they were unaware of the [GIF-Unisys patent]
overlap is unclear.” Id. In 1994, Uniysis then proceeded to assert its patent
against Compuserve and those companies that used the GIF standard, “a group
that included virtually every major company on the Internet at one point in
time.” Id.
141
Much of the concern in the literature has been with patent “trolls” who buy
patents from inventors then search for potentially infringing uses. See, e.g., Carl
Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-ups, and Patent Royalties (UC Berkeley Working
Paper, August 2006), available at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/royalties.pdf (royalty overcharges may
occur for weak patents involving minor features of the potentially infringing
design).
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Presuming that innovation harm outweighs price efficiency
benefits reflects an extreme degree of deference inconsistent with that
which antitrust either has or should accord the patent system.142 The
deference of antitrust to the patent system extends only to allowing
exclusivity. When exclusivity engenders monopoly power, the antitrust
laws treat the patent-based monopoly in much the same manner as it
would treat a monopoly with non-patent origins.143
If economic
reasoning and reality suggest that antitrust law should permit buyer
conspiracies to provide a countervailing force against a monopoly that
does not depend on patent exclusivity, such analysis must likewise be
applied to conspiracies that provide a force against a monopoly that does
depend on patent-granted exclusivity. A law that insulated a patentdependent monopoly but did not shield other monopolies would amount
to unwarranted special treatment for patents.144
¶103

Finally, it is important to recognize that the animating economic
argument for more lenient treatment emerges from the flat supply curve,
which characterizes intellectual property but is not solely manifested
within intellectual property contexts. If other general classes of goods or
services have flat supply curves, then the foregoing analysis suggests that
those classes are also candidates for more lenient treatment.
¶104

CONCLUSION
In an ideal antitrust world, the costs and benefits of any suspect
conduct would be readily apparent and fully quantified. Obviously, that
level of insight does not exist—particularly when it comes to predicting
future innovation effects.
Nonetheless, given the importance of
innovation to consumer welfare and to the economy, antitrust necessarily
implicates dynamic effects. This iBrief advocates a more conscious
treatment of those effects within the specific context of buyer price¶105
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In recent years the antitrust community has focused increasing attention on
both substantive and procedural aspects of the patent-granting process and, in
particular, upon the issue of improvidently-granted patents. See generally FED.
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 46; Hillary Greene, Afterword: The Role of the
Competition Community in the Patent Law Discourse, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 841
(2002) (analyzing the basis for and advocating such a broad role for the
antitrust/competition community).
143
See generally IP GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at § 2.1 (“The [federal antitrust]
Agencies apply the same general antitrust principles to conduct involving
intellectual property that they apply to conduct involving any other form of
tangible or intangible property. . . . Intellectual property is thus neither
particularly free from scrutiny under the antitrust laws, nor particularly suspect
under them.”).
144
These same arguments hold for market power that is less than monopoly.
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fixing involving intellectual property. Legal engagement of this issue,
along the lines proposed, constitutes a necessary first step.
This iBrief analyzed buyer price-fixing and determined that
given a flat supply curve, buyer collusion will not result in price
inefficiencies and, in fact, when deployed against sellers with market
power, it will likely increase price efficiency. Such circumstances are
not rare as pure intellectual property is characterized by a flat supply
curve. Thus, for at least this class of property, it would seem that per se
condemnation of buyer price-fixing does not have a firm economic
justification even assuming potential losses to innovative efficiency.
¶106

The instant proposal for recognizing the price efficiencies
offered by buyer conspiracies in pure intellectual property settings is
narrowly circumscribed. Given the difficulty inherent in balancing
current price effects against future innovation effects, it recommends a
coarse screen that focuses on the existence of such effects. Where both
effects can be shown to be more than de minimis and the buyer
conspiracy has a not insubstantial market share, it adheres to current
buyer conspiracy law by favoring innovation over price effect; however,
this screen enables buyer conspiracies to survive legal challenge when
the buyers show price efficiencies are passed through to consumers and
the seller cannot demonstrate the requisite innovation harm. The
proposed screen affects not only antitrust law, but also the rewards
associated with the exclusivity patents confer. Antitrust law would no
longer protect patent holder rents through per se condemnation of
potentially efficient buyer price-fixing. Though this specific proposal is
new, it constitutes an application of the well-established principle that
rewards associated with a patent should be bounded by competition
policy considerations.
¶107

